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IMPLEMENTING SUPPLY PRACTICE AT BRIDGEND ENGINE PLANT  
The influence of institutional and strategic choice perspectives 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – This paper investigates the stalled adoption of a supplier park at Bridgend Engine Plant 
in the UK. It starts from the position that not all firms can or should implement the same set of 
practices.  
Design/methodology/approach – Critical Incident Technique and semi-structured interviews over 5 
years were used to understand the influence of institutional and strategic choices during the 
implementation of a supplier park. A conceptual framework was developed to incorporate practices 
broadly associated with parks i.e. improving supply stability, supply coordination, redefining the 
OEM/supplier boundary and enhancing interaction between co-located firms.   
Findings – The findings demonstrate a limited implementation of supply practices at Bridgend with 
only one component supplier brought onto the site. The original plan was to create a supplier park 
that would ‘grow’ to an industrial park, creating an automotive sector in the area. However, a 
combination of operational, processual, and contextual factors have conspired against the plan. 
Research limitations/implications – The combination of a broad range of theoretical and practical 
elements means there are associated discussions that could be more fully explored. Condensing the 
interview notes has resulted in the researchers own interpretation of events becoming a significant 
reality filter. Whilst single case studies raise inevitable concerns over comparability, our focus is on 
theoretical generalizability through richness of empirical data. 
Originality/value of the paper – As firms continue to use best practice as a core ingredient of 
strategy, researchers must respond with robust theoretical concepts explaining adoption and 
implementation. This paper integrates disparate perspectives across multiple levels in order to build 
a richer and more believable picture of a stalled initiative. Three key conclusions can be drawn: the 
contingent nature of ‘bundles of practice’, implications of political ambiguity over the efficiency 
argument and the effect of isomorphic or bandwagon responses by firms. 
 
Keywords: Best practice, supplier parks, isomorphism, engine manufacture, innovation 
Paper type: Research paper 
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IMPLEMENTING SUPPLY PRACTICE AT BRIDGEND ENGINE PLANT  
The influence of institutional and strategic choice perspectives 
 
Introduction 
More than a decade has passed since Ford, the global automotive firm, first suggested 
creating an industrial park on a site adjacent to its engine plant in Bridgend, South Wales. 
The land available is not Ford land, the majority is owned by the Welsh Development 
Agency. This factor was critical because public funding could not be attracted to a 
supplier park purely for the benefit of Ford alone. The plan, therefore, was to attract tier 1 
and 2 automotive suppliers, plus service providers, onto the site with the ability to supply 
product not only to Ford, but to any other customer. This was the critical difference 
between a single-OEM dedicated supplier park and an automotive industrial park. The 
initial attraction was for current Bridgend Engine Plant (BEP) suppliers to be the first 
inhabitants, and create a supplier park that would ‘grow’ to an industrial park with the 
long-term goal to create an automotive sector in the Bridgend area. Yet despite 
considerable effort from BEP, the implementation of the park began to deviate from the 
original concept at stage one.  
Dedicated sites such as supplier parks, where component suppliers decentralise 
production to units located close to assembly plants (Millington et al., 1998), have rapidly 
established themselves as best practice (Hayes and Wheelright, 1984; Schonberger, 1986) 
in the automotive sector. During the 1990s for instance, most Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEMs) including Ford, General Motors, Fiat, Peugeot, Renault, BMW 
and Volkswagen, implemented or were in the process of implementing some kind of 
supplier park initiative e.g. there are currently 23 in Europe and 35 Worldwide. Such 
widespread adoption (Cullen, 2002; Larsson, 2002; Chew, 2003; Reichhart and Holweg, 
2005; Howard and Miemczyk, 2006) would seem to suggest, a priori, that the nature and 
benefits of this practice are well understood by practitioners. Yet against this backdrop of 
automotive sector isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), the Bridgend plan of an 
initial supplier park remains predominantly a plan rather than a place. Most strikingly, all 
the infrastructural amenities and access roads are in place, there is even a logistics 
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provider available to ship components to the nearby engine plant, but there is only one 
low value (literally ‘nuts and bolts’) supplier on site. In seeking to increase our 
theoretical and practical understanding of how complex and multi-faceted practice is 
adopted and adapted, this apparent lack of first steps in the supplier park race is 
particularly interesting. Given that the decision has been taken and repeatedly endorsed to 
implement a supplier park at Bridgend, the timeframe associated with the case mean that 
it provides unusual access to the normally hidden routines (Jones and Stevens, 1999) 
associated with stalled or failed practice adoption. Equally, the case presents an unusual 
set of operational factors and organizational context that allow for further criticism 
(Sousa and Voss, 2001) of universalistic approaches to practice applicability. While not 
seeking to develop a full-blown contingency approach (e.g. Utterback and Abernathy, 
1975; Miles and Snow, 1984), the paper argues that the successful implementation of 
supplier park practice will depend upon some combination of operational (e.g. Hayes and 
Wheelwright, 1979), organizational process (e.g. Pettigrew, 1985; Johnson, 1987) and 
broader contextual (e.g. McKone and Schroeder, 2002) characteristics.  
The paper is structured as follows. First, there is an examination of the literature whereby 
the operational supplier park concept is described as a bundle of discrete practices, and 
extant processual and contextual perspectives on practice adoption are summarised. 
Second, the critical event research method and the case study are introduced. Third, the 
analytical core of the paper deploys the conceptual schema to seek operational, 
processual and contextual insights from the Bridgend case. Finally, the implications for 
theory and practice are presented in the conclusion. 
 
Defining the conceptual framework 
The existence of a profitable market for fashionable management ideas (Abrahamson 
1991; 1996) goes a long way to explaining the endless search for axiomatic practice 
principles (e.g. Womack and Jones, 1994). At the same time there is, at least amongst 
most researchers, a growing acceptance that few discrete practices or bundles of practice 
can ever deliver universal competitive value. Resource/capability-based theory for 
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example, offers an implicit yet powerful critique of much research directed towards 
establishing ‘best practice’ (Powell, 1995; Laugen et al., 2005). If it is the unique aspects 
of an organisation that create long-lasting advantage, the suggestion that factors common 
to several firms can be sources of success is problematic. This paper starts from the 
position that not all organizations can, or should, implement the same set of practices 
(Galbraith, 1977).  
 
Models of strategic choice 
A growing number of empirical studies suggest that practice innovation and adoption 
relates to specific - disembodied and asocial - organizational characteristics such as firm 
size (White et al., 1999), plant age, unionization status (Shah and Ward, 1995). Less 
empirical attention has been given, perhaps because of the predominance of survey based 
research methods, to those organizational factors emerging from the interactive and 
socially complex behaviours associated with the strategy process (Pettigrew, 1985; 
Johnson, 1987; Orlikowski, 2000; Brown and Duguid, 1991; 2001). Corporate politics, 
for instance, is an inescapable fact of life for most managers (Buchanan and Badham, 
1999) yet it is rarely discussed in the predominantly rationalist models of practice 
adoption. Moreover such factors may be particularly significant when considering 
‘boundary spanning’ (e.g. Dollinger, 1984; Ibarra, 1993; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001) 
change initiatives such as a supplier park. Interestingly, although empirical observation 
would suggest that there is a minimum scale (in terms of supplier base, capital 
availability, market power, human resources, etc) necessary to even begin to consider 
adopting a supplier park initiative, it has long been noted (e.g. Chandler, 1962) that the 
‘bureaucratic burden’ tends to be more onerous in larger organizations. Likewise, 
evolutionary economics (e.g. Aldrich, 1979; Nelson and Winter, 1982) suggests that the 
longer the experience an organization has with certain practices, the harder they are to 
replace (Pil and MacDuffie, 1996). In other words, processual variables can create 
inertial forces (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) sufficient to adversely influence the 
implementation of even the most technically rational practices. 
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The operations literature makes regular reference to the decision areas addressed 
explicitly or implicitly in the medium and long-term management of operational 
resources. In strategy process terms, such typologies represent an ‘intermediate’ 
conceptualization: not seeking to determine or translate fundamental market or resource 
priorities, but rather offering a useful summary of the scope of the management task. The 
earliest variants delineated manufacturing strategy decisions (i.e. plant/equipment, 
planning/control, organization/management, labour/staffing, design/engineering) and 
these continue to influence the categories used by operations strategy authors. Over time, 
as Operations Management broadened, the decision areas have multiplied with the 
inclusion of, for instance, quality systems and supply chain decisions (Hayes and 
Wheelwright, 1984; Fine and Hax, 1985). Increasingly, operational practices are seen as 
affecting performance, not as individual elements, but conceptualised as interrelated and 
internally consistent ‘bundles’ (Macduffie, 1995; Shah and Ward, 2003). 
Another significant driver of new practice adoption is the so-called ‘bandwagon’ effect. 
A bandwagon is a diffusion process where organizations adopt innovations because of 
external pressure caused by the large number of organizations that have already adopted, 
or are considering adopting, the concept (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983) and not because of 
any rational efficiency argument of the practice. In some cases, companies still adopt new 
methods even after they have assessed them as highly inefficient and likely to cause 
losses, due to bandwagon pressures (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993).  Typically, the 
pursuing legitimacy (Scott, 1995) leads to the adoption of a practice because management 
is more concerned about being perceived by customers, suppliers, investors and 
competitors as industry laggards, than any real fears about misapplying the practice. 
Following the lead of other organizations (whether right or wrong) is often the simplest 
way forward, especially when innovations are new or not well-understood (March and 
Olsen, 1976). These arguments call for inclusion of this perspective, established in the 
Institutionalist School, within the mainstream operations thinking of practice adoption. 
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The supplier park as ‘bundle of practice’ 
The bundle of practices associated with supplier parks broadly include improving supply 
stability, supply coordination, redefining the OEM/supplier boundary and enhancing 
interaction between co-located firms (Cullen, 2002; Larsson, 2002; Chew, 2003; Sako, 
2003; Reichhart and Holweg, 2005; Howard and Miemczyk, 2006).  While some of the 
practices correspond with established manufacturing approaches, especially in the lean 
context (Shah and Ward, 2003), others offer a distinct supplier park trait (Table 1). 
Insert Table 1: Practices adopted at European supplier parks 
Typically the supplier park concept is introduced as an experiment in an emerging market 
first and implemented in the home market later. Volkswagen was arguably the first, 
building an industrial estate close to the Seat plant for 15 suppliers in Spain (1991), 
followed by a series of initiatives in Brazil, including Volkswagen’s Resende plant 
(1997), General Motor’s Blue Macaw project (2000) and Ford’s Amazon Project (2002). 
Supplier parks represent shared proximity yet distributed ownership, which means 
clustering suppliers under the same roof or in separate buildings and investment in land, 
buildings and facilities shared with the OEM (Sako, 2003). In terms of international trade 
and regional economic development, supplier parks are subject to different 
interpretations. Sako (2003 p1) summarizes these views as either ‘clusters with all the 
goodness of a locally embedded production system [or] ...an ultimate tool by 
multinational corporations to de-territorialize and control the global commodity chain’.  
Supply Stability 
Problematically a daily assembly schedule and vehicle assembly sequence is of little use 
where suppliers are located thousands of miles away, work to long delivery lead times, 
and are subject to frequent supply interruptions or disturbances (Svensson, 2000). In 1992 
for instance, Seat moved their main assembly plant from the suburbs of Barcelona to an 
industrial district 50 kilometres away and simultaneously opened the Abrera supplier 
park. Today the park is home to 32 suppliers, embarking 63 ‘in-sequence’ component 
sets on their final 10 minute journey to 3 different vehicle assembly lines almost one 
thousand times per day. This ‘risk management’ notion has been presented as a primary 
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factor influencing the adoption of supplier parks (Cullen, 2002) yet it is unclear whether 
bringing suppliers close to their customer manufacturing sites does indeed reduce these 
types of disturbances.  
Supply coordination 
Supplier co-ordination activities mould suppliers into a common way of working so that 
competitive advantage can be gained, particularly by removing inter-company waste 
(Hines et al., 2000). One approach to improving coordination has been proximity, for 
example ‘successive production stages are located in close proximity to one another to 
improve coordination and economize on inventory and transportation costs’ (Dyer, 1996 
p.273). However, such site specificity has widely known problems related to the 
transaction cost argument of asset specificity (Dyer, 1996). The activity of coordination is 
also simplified through supply consolidation and rationalisation of the bill of materials, 
despite the fact that this often pushes the coordination effort further upstream (Cousins, 
1999). This practice is widely seen in assembly plant supplier parks where only modules 
are delivered in sequence, as opposed to sub-components (Sako, 2003; Reichhart and 
Holweg, 2005). Other practices to improve coordination include inventory management 
initiatives such as Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI), a common aspect of automotive 
supplier parks (Howard and Miemczyk, 2006). 
Value chain configuration 
General supplier park literature describes a range of activities at the boundary between 
OEMs and suppliers, from pure warehousing to full vehicle assembly. Problems of levels 
of vertical integration are neatly summarised in the Fisher body case.  Klein et al., (1978) 
describe the dealings that culminated in a vertical merger in the 1920s between General 
Motors and Fisher Body, a leading supplier of the new style of closed auto bodies. An 
exclusive dealing arrangement significantly reduced the possibility of GM acting 
opportunistically by demanding a lower price for the bodies after Fisher made the 
specific investment in production capacity. Unfortunately, these pricing provisions did 
not work out in practice. The shift in demand from open towards closed-style bodies 
meant GM was unhappy with the price it was being charged by its now very important 
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supplier. Fisher refused to locate their body plants adjacent to GM’s assembly plants, a 
move GM claimed was necessary for production efficiency but which required a large 
and very specific investment on the part of Fisher. Finding the contractual relationship 
intolerable, GM began negotiations for purchasing the stock of Fisher Body, culminating 
in a final merger agreement in 1926.      
The degree to which post-contractual opportunistic behaviour occurs is dependent on 
how specific the assets are to the transaction, and therefore how difficult it is to write 
contracts accounting for all contingencies. If supplier facilities at supplier parks have 
highly specific assets (i.e. physical, human, and site-related) then the risks of 
opportunistic re-contracting is higher (Millington et al., 1998). Specific assets can also 
lead to strategic inflexibility, as the OEM is dependent on the co-located supplier. This 
issue was summarised by one automotive supplier as ‘while the set-up fosters a long-term 
partnership, it reduces flexibility in quality or cost disputes’ (Cullen, 2002). 
Enhanced interaction 
Many advocates of supplier/OEM proximity refer to softer benefits such as enhanced 
communications and better knowledge-sharing (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Interestingly, 
related work exploring the benefits of industry clusters suggests that this kind of rich 
knowledge exchange can underpin the development of specific, additional, capabilities 
(Saxenian, 1994). More than two decades ago, Schonberger and Gilbert (1983) argued 
that the success of JIT practised by firms implementing lean principles was strongly 
associated with geographically proximate suppliers. However, recent research has shown 
that this is not always the case (Wafa et al., 1996). Specifically, information 
communication technologies are able to mitigate the effects of distance on successful 
just-in-time practices defined as reductions in inventory, component rejects, and delivery 
lead time (Lee and Whang, 1998). 
Reichhart and Holweg (2005) further reinforce the positive elements of enhanced 
interaction through sharing of confidential wage information (between all parties on a 
supplier park) and inventory information (between OEMs and suppliers). The former 
ensured that wage equalisation stopped opportunistic bargaining by employees, and the 
latter, reduction in inter-company waste. 
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Thus far, this discussion of supplier parks as a bundle of practices adopted by automotive 
OEMs is helpful in assessing the extent to which the bundle is adopted. While current 
descriptions of supplier parks are mostly limited to automotive assembly parks, the 
concept of this bundle of practices appears to suit, at least conceptually, a variety of 
manufacturing environments where flexibility and responsiveness of supply are critical 
(for an alternative example see the description by Slack et al (2004) p.79 of Flextronics). 
It is argued that the practices are sufficiently generic (not vehicle assembly plant specific) 
to warrant application to this case. Yet there are always situational specifics, and thus 
further theoretical variables are now examined to shed light on why practice bundles are 
adopted either as a whole or partially. 
Impact of contextual variables upon supplier park adoption 
Curiously, although the management literature is replete with examples of how 
environmental factors such as region, industry and economic conditions impact on 
organisational performance (e.g. Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Swamidass and Newell, 
1987; Grant and Gregory, 1997; Ahire and Dreyfuss, 2000), organisational context has 
traditionally been missing from specific discussions of practice adoption (Shah and Ward, 
1995; Voss and Blackmon, 1998; Ward and Duray, 2000). This is particularly 
problematic when considering the diffusion of a practice like supplier parks which is an 
essentially network phenomenon, heavily influenced by globalisation, market power, and 
conformity pressures. There is a macro-literature concerned with factors, such as 
regulation, that can lead to sectoral isomorphism, or common practice (e.g. DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983) but, as Sousa and Voss (2001) highlight when reviewing studies of 
TQM adoption (arguably the richest practice literature), there have been few rigorous and 
explicit (and fewer still empirical: see Benson et al., 1994) attempts to ‘raise the 
possibility of QM practices being context dependent’ (p384). Moreover, the contextual 
variables that are cited (e.g. industry, country, company size, plant type, etc) lack the 
specificity that will readily translate to either theory development or practical 
prescription. For instance, most supplier parks are automotive initiatives, several have 
been successfully created in the UK, and perhaps most intriguingly, Ford itself has had 
supplier park success in other parts of its global network. As a further illustration of the 
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need for a finer grained perspective on context, the need for physical supply security (i.e. 
avoiding shrinkage) caused by the characteristics of ‘higher risk’ operating environments 
or the explicitly political work of accessing state aid in its various forms, are key 
contextual factors largely missing from discussions of supplier park initiatives to date. 
Yet public actors through state aid have a significant role to play in establishing suitable 
infrastructure (Peck, 1996). 
The Bridgend Engine Plant (BEP) and supplier park initiative 
Ford Motor Company announced plans to build an engine plant at Bridgend in September 
1977. This was considered important to the economic development of the area, where the 
£180 million capital investment by Ford attracted £115 million of government assistance 
through job creation and regional grant schemes. Bridgend was selected to be the main 
supplier of engines to the British-based companies in Ford’s Premium Auto Group (PAG) 
founded in 1999, chiefly because of the favourable road and rail links to the rest of 
Britain. Engines from Bridgend are now supplied to Land Rover, Jaguar as well as 
traditional ‘blue oval’ Fords. Supplying PAG, including overseas customer Volvo in 
Sweden, will significantly increase engine production and raise total plant output to 
around 1 million engines per year by 2010 (Figure 1). In order to achieve the extra 
capacity requirements and manage the additional engine variety, Ford has looked at how 
it handles materials coming into the factory. As part of a £240 million investment, the 
company investigated the building of a new de-consolidation facility and the location of a 
supplier or ‘industrial’ park adjacent to the engine plant to house suppliers for the new 
engines. 
Insert Figure 1: BEP production volume 1979 – 2009 
The introduction of the PAG engines will increase the plant’s product range, expanding 
not only the level of engine variety but also resulting in considerable component 
complexity. There are three engine types currently built at Bridgend: the V8 Engine for 
Jaguar and Land Rover, and the Sigma and SI6 engines fitted in blue oval Fords. 
Building PAG engines has added another 4 engine types to the plant’s output, in addition 
to current Ford and Jaguar engines. The proposed PAG engines raise significant concern 
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over the increase in the level of planning and operational complexity. The additional 
PAG customers mean the engines will be used in 9 distinct vehicle applications. 
Considering there are 3 base engine architectures, variations in aspiration and 
displacement mean that there are 25 distinct varieties of finished engines. When options 
for regional and operational differences are added, the result is that engine variations will 
grow from a total of 4 in 1979, to an estimated 44 available in 2009, supplied to 9 
customer locations across Europe (Table 2). Although the engines will be all built 
together at one facility, each customer demands specific characteristics such as the 
leaping cat or blue oval logo on oil filters and casings for their engines to maintain brand 
image. The following sections outline the Ford BEP plans and objectives for the supplier 
park. 
Insert Table 2: BEP product variety 1979 – 2009 
Facilities 
The organisation of facilities at BEP is driven by the need for production flexibility, in a 
plant that is space constrained, as well as cutting costs by sharing investments with 
partners such as the Welsh Development Agency (WDA). This led to the proposal to use 
adjacent land for materials management and supplier production. In order to encourage 
suppliers, the space was badged ‘industry park’ to encompass dedicated and non-
dedicated facilities and BEP management negotiated with the WDA to locate suppliers 
close to the plant with a link ‘through the fence’. At the same time the proposal 
comprised a deconsolidation and sequencing logistics centre to manage BEP’s lengthy 
supply lines of deep sea shipments (e.g. from Korea). 
Suppliers and partners 
Only five companies considered the option to locate satellite facilities at the plant: a 
number described by Ford as ‘not yet reaching critical mass’. The problem for Ford is 
how to persuade suppliers that they will benefit by locating next to the engine plant. 
Providing a local logistics centre will enable Ford to improve management of complexity 
from the new engines. Plant management at Bridgend consider the logistics centre to 
offer a number of potential benefits: 
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• Manage the flow of materials into the plant 
• Sequence parts and collate engine kits 
• Provide an inventory buffer for suppliers unable to ship daily  
Apart from the logistics supplier, Ford also needed to attract those suppliers providing the 
more complex components and sub-assemblies that will vary between brands and 
engines. The greatest improvements in operational efficiency will be the result of 
attracting suppliers which late-configure components to deliver in-sequence, compared to 
those providing localised warehousing for non-complex parts.  The later value is added to 
components related to the build sequence, the greater the benefits not only to the 
company but also to the effect on the development of the local community. 
Investment 
The proposed development at Bridgend will involve an investment in the region of £240 
million (not only for the supplier park). The WDA has applied for funding to the value of 
£17.4 million from the European Community to assist with the project in the form of 
regional and training aid.  Securing funding for the project will help prevent production 
of the new engines being allocated to the alternative North American site proposed by 
Ford. This is done by equalising the cost differences in production (although the hidden 
costs of US sourcing have not been explicitly included in the estimates). 
Logistics 
As production areas are at a premium within the factory, ‘non-value adding’ space for 
warehousing and materials management that serves as a line feed kanban cannot expand 
and in fact BEP looks for opportunities to decrease this where possible. As part of the 
new supply strategy, BEP planned to use a logistics specialist to deliver component kits 
to line side ‘in sequence’ from a de-consolidation and sequencing centre. This specialist 
would manage suppliers on a ‘bulls eye’ basis, with first tier suppliers close by (on the 
park), and lower tier suppliers further a-field. Although Ford adopts conveyor systems in 
other supplier parks, to deliver from suppliers to the assembly line, the lack of component 
volumes (size and quantity) does not merit this approach. However, BEP anticipates 
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entrusting movements to the logistics specialist to rationalise traffic flows of inbound and 
outbound products in the face of increased volume and complexity. 
Production  
To ensure smooth operation of the production plant for the new engines, the plant must 
be sequenced upstream of final vehicle assembly with the suppliers. To avoid holding 
excessive stocks of PAG engines, the trigger for the build sequence must come from the 
assembly plant on a need-only basis. The current engine line up at BEP does not require 
this level of coordination across the supply chain. While all PAG partners are answerable 
to Ford, sequencing the final build requirements across multiple geographically dispersed 
sites with Bridgend means coordinating tier 1 and tier 2 suppliers may prove to be 
difficult. This is further complicated by the volatility of current production patterns which 
often deviate from the forecast. A critical aspect of production at BEP is the management 
of labour. While expansion will increase headcount, the introduction of a supplier park is 
likely to force a reconsideration of job roles within the plant. The company faces difficult 
decisions over how to outsource internal logistics responsibilities to suppliers or logistics 
providers. 
 
Research method 
A detailed case analysis of the attempt to create a supplier park at Bridgend forms the 
empirical core of the paper. Case studies are particularly useful when exploring new areas 
of research (Voss et al., 2002; Stuart et al., 2002, Eisenhardt, 1989) and equally, the rich 
qualitative and quantitative data sets generated (Yin, 1994) are particularly important 
because the measurement of intangible phenomena e.g. roles and relationships (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 2005) was a central concern. Studies of single organizations or sectors 
remain popular in management research because they offer the opportunity for deep, 
longitudinal analysis, exploring the impact of organizational change (Tyrrall and Parker, 
2005) and often involve the development of conceptual frameworks or interpretative 
schemes (Mueller et al., 2003). 
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Primary data was collected using semi-structured interview questions, each interview 
lasted between 1.5 and 2.5 hours, investigating the sub-elements defined by the 
conceptual model (i.e. operational, processual and contextual factors) and the respondent-
driven Critical Incident Technique (CIT) (Flanagan, 1954; Bitner et al., 1990; 
Edvardsson, 1992; Mattsson, 1993; Johnston, 1995). The former aims at a global case 
description and understanding of the behaviour of firms over time, whereas the latter is 
used to map micro-level incidents as individual respondents experience them. For this 
purpose we defined an event to be ‘a retrospective organisation of a set of inter-related 
incidents into a comprehensive narrative’ and for an event to be classified as ‘critical’ 
meant that it ‘was perceived to have had a positive or negative outcome for a person or 
the organisation’. A chronology of activities by Ford leading up to and after the decision 
to build the BEP supplier park was created as a guide to familiarise the investigators with 
contemporary events at the site (Appendix A). 
Insert Table 3: Supply practice research 
A total of 20 different interviews were carried out with senior management and 
supporting regional staff in charge of this and parallel supplier projects. In terms of 
number of interviews per category, this consisted of senior managers at Ford Europe (n = 
6), managers of the supply operations asked to participate in the supplier park (n = 11), 
and representatives from the regional development agency (n = 3), see table 3. This 
permitted access to three distinct relationships: (a) between BEP and Ford Corporate; (b) 
between BEP and those suppliers who were to be the first major participants in the 
supplier park, and; (c) between BEP/Ford and the regional agency. To improve the 
reliability and validity of the results, the outline findings (including potential differences 
of interpretation) were presented back to interviewees, giving participants an opportunity 
to question the findings and the conclusions drawn. In selecting potential sites, random 
sampling was neither necessary, nor even preferable (Eisenhardt, 1989), especially as 
connecting different levels and units of analysis is a central concern of this research. This 
non-trivial conceptual and methodological hurdle is ameliorated by the restricted focus 
on a single case faced with the issues of increasing volumes and variety, the adoption of a 
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single practice bundle (the supplier park) and one specific sector (automotive). Moreover, 
several other Ford sites have supplier parks (e.g. Valencia, Cologne) and Bridgend 
managers sought to adopt this practice as an important part of their own strategy to cope 
with increasing pressures from their customers, including other divisions within Ford.  
 
Findings 
The findings demonstrate a very limited implementation of supplier park practices at BEP 
(Table 4). These can be summarized as bringing one supplier (BBB Hardware) close to 
the site using a dedicated warehouse. The supply of goods was consolidated from 32 
suppliers to 1, and with JIT supply implemented from the warehouse to the BEP internal 
store. Cooperation between the supplier and sub-suppliers now exists to discuss future 
design changes on hardware only.  
Insert Table 4: Practices adopted at BEP 
Supply Stability  
An original goal of BEP was to create supply stability by bringing suppliers physically 
closer and creating dedicated non-OEM space. The regional funding grant provided by 
the WDA to develop the park at Bridgend was conditional in that the site had to provide a 
hotel and a leisure centre to serve the local community as well as needs of the engine 
plant: ‘we wanted it next to the fence’ (Supply/Operations Manager). This broadly fitted 
with the thinking at BEP in 1999, although some negotiation was required over who was 
to provide the park infrastructure: ‘they [the WDA] were a tad reticent, but its happening 
now’ (Senior Manager).  
The approach stipulated by the WDA and fully supported by BEP was to adopt the idea 
of a general industry park, not just a supplier park. ‘Government grants are critical to the 
success of a plant like Bridgend in South Wales ... There are lots of plants with over-
capacity and grants play a big part in deciding where new programmes go’ 
(Development Agency Representative). The driver for BEP was that manufacturing space 
within the plant is valuable and hence the need to ‘fill the space with value-added’ 
 16
(Supply/Operations). The prime cost driver is labour hours per engine, therefore BEP 
want to reduce this in any way possible by ‘taking hours away from the engine’ 
(Supply/Operations). Yet supplier parks have had a chequered history at Ford, such as the 
Saarlouis plant that forced suppliers onto the site and then increased component prices. 
Despite the well-established supplier park trend BEP was determined to be different, 
offering suppliers the option to move to Bridgend whether the additional capacity was to 
serve Ford or a competitor: ‘…it’s a voluntary process, so the supplier can provide for 
other customers as well as BEP’ (Supply/Operations). However, the uptake by suppliers 
to locate to the park has been minimal: ‘we were unsuccessful’ (Senior Manager).  
Since the original visit to the Ford Valencia supplier park by BEP managers and the 
WDA in 1999, there have been considerable political pressures and institutional barriers 
to overcome. Central to the case is the proposal for the Bridgend site being different 
because the intention for an industrial park as opposed to a supplier park. The land 
adjacent to the plant is owned by the WDA, although it was agreed that it would be 
largely automotive: ‘Ford cannot dictate who or what went on the park’ (Development 
Agency). The decision to open the industrial park to all suppliers was intended to attract 
EU funding. The catalyst for Ford was the emergence of the PAG engine strategy to 
consolidate in Bridgend, Sweden or Cleveland (US), or buy in engines from another 
source. WDA were anxious to present an overwhelming case for why a potential $400 
million investment should come to Bridgend in Wales and commissioned a study by a 
leading consultancy.  
Yet the WDA and BEP struggled to gain the internal support needed from senior Ford 
management until meeting with the President of Ford of Europe, David Thursfield, in the 
autumn of 2000. He conditionally agreed with the strategy for BEP, but only on a case by 
case progression, i.e. it had to be a sound business case and profitable. Unfortunately, 
events unfolding elsewhere across the company overshadowed the plans for Bridgend. 
Major restructuring in Europe and the closure of the Dagenham vehicle plant rightly 
commanded senior management’s attention and the plan did not receive adequate internal 
support.   
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Supply coordination 
The impending uplift in production is primarily due to the increase in demand by Ford for 
the PAG engines, which includes different variations in power and durability for Jaguar, 
Land Rover and Volvo. The creation of Ford’s premium vehicle segment has impacted on 
BEP because ‘PAG will give us complexity’ (Supply/Operations). This means the level of 
model variety is set to increase significantly, from 19 types of engine produced at present, 
to an estimated 44 by the end of the decade. This introduces considerable inventory cost 
implications, difficulties in terms of space, and managing the stocks of parts needed to 
maintain supply to the BEP engine lines. 
The inherent difference across BEP customers also introduces the issue of coordination. 
Volvo will give short-term changes, for example: the next day’s schedule is firm, but next 
week will change. Ford gives a level and fixed schedule where the first 10 days are firm. 
‘Ford is a suit off the peg [whereas] Volvo is made to measure’ (Senior Manager). Land 
Rover will also affect BEP because it is looking for a 50% increase in volume, so they in 
turn are seeking to increase supplier capacity. However, components such as wire 
harnesses are supplied from the Philippines and involve a 16-week lead time, which 
means the schedule must be modified immediately. 
Supply consolidation/rationalisation  
Ford, Jaguar and Volvo purchasing and supply organizations were at the time under great 
pressure to secure cost savings under the Team Value Management (TVM) banner 
instigated by Thursfield, but there was not a centralised commitment and the three 
Purchasing organisations ‘could never get a joint act together’ (Supply/Operations). 
Organizational hierarchy meant economies of scale could never be realised across a 
potential 1 million units per year at Bridgend. Criteria such as inventory costs (owned by 
the plant), freight costs (owned by no-one), quality (absorbed by the plant), and 
continuity of supply (a cost consequence to the plant) ‘were all overridden by immediate 
piece cost advantages owned by purchasing’ (Supply/Operations). The local 
implementation of rationalising only hardware (nuts, bolts and fasteners being non-
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strategic) simply reinforces the position that joint economies of scale could not be made 
across PAG as a whole. 
Improved inventory management practice (e.g. VMI), JIT and JIS supply  
 
There is considerable debate between managers at Volvo and other PAG partners on 
flexibility. This follows the argument that supports building-to-order, a concept that 
Volvo has developed over the past 15 years. Volvo uses its own ‘chimney model’ for 
suppliers whereby there is little margin on sales of new vehicles that are common 
specification models, and higher margins on vehicles that are less-common specification. 
This means there could be a 150% change in the production schedule, so Volvo looks to 
install flexibility in suppliers to vary manufacturing levels on a monthly and weekly 
basis, using local warehouses to cope with this variability. However, Ford adopts a 
different approach, preferring to run production using a levelled schedule. There is ‘a 
philosophical battle between Volvo and Ford’ concerning which approach takes 
precedence: build-to-order or make-to-stock (Senior Manager).    
Furthermore, the demands of PAG on Bridgend means complexity is growing, 
particularly as these luxury vehicles tend to be more customer-driven than the traditional 
mass-market approach by Ford. Even the approach to dealing with PAG components is 
different than BEP has been used to in the past. For example, wiring harnesses from 
Japan normally involve a 4 week pipeline due to sea freight. They are product-specific 
where even wire length differentiates it from other engine types. Ideally the final 
operation of cutting the wire is left until the plant, but as BEP doesn’t do this it must pay 
for premium airfreight to cope with fluctuations in demand. 
These issues combined would suggest a great need for flexibility through new inventory 
management practices. Surprisingly, the implementation of these practices is limited only 
to hardware that is not particularly influenced by variability in demand. Senior 
management appears not yet to have accepted the challenge for specifying how to 
manage long-distance supply chains.   
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Value chain re-configuration 
BEP felt it was offering suppliers an opportunity when it came to deciding the type of 
operations to co-locate, ‘it was up to the supplier to decide’ (Supply/Operations). 
However, BEP was looking for particular types of suppliers: 
• Major castings i.e. heavy and expensive items 
• Select fit parts e.g. tappets currently required in 50 different lengths so they 
could machine it overnight and deliver next day 
• Wiring harnesses i.e. late product differentiation overnight 
• Hardware e.g. nuts and bolts. This seemed counterintuitive, but represents 
one of the few successes of the industry park. Whereas before there were 32 
shipping points of 237 part numbers, now there is just ‘BBB’. 
The business case for the industrial park was to preserve high value added at BEP. In 
reality, the park is bound to be predominantly ‘a warehouse’, but supply chain 
complexity is now reduced as a result of dealing with one hardware company and a 
logistics provider who currently represent the sole occupiers of the site. BEP wanted to 
have minor sub-assembly and sequencing activity carried out by suppliers. At present it 
has plans for a line-feed of hardware, including washing of dunnage, picking, packing 
and sequencing. The argument remains to preserve high ‘value-add’ at the BEP plant and 
outsource low value-add or waste activities.  
Reducing labour hours per engine is the primary cost driver for BEP. This is particularly 
pertinent given that the total volume of engines is set to increase from 600,000 per annum 
at present levels, to 1 million predicted for 2010 based on current growth. However, there 
is no evidence to show that this performance measure would be improved by the 
introduction of supplier park practices e.g. outsourcing non value-added activity. 
Enhanced interaction 
There was limited evidence of enhanced interaction due to the co-location of BBB with 
the exception of a remit to examine existing designs.  As part of the BBB contract with 
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BEP, they must analyse designs in order to deliver on the promise of future savings. 
‘They have an engineer on site to look at this. They carry out quality checks’ 
(Supply/Operations). Again, BEP views this as a means to reducing indirect overtime 
costs, to ship out low value activities to logistics. But this appears to be an implicit threat 
that the Logistics/MP&L function at BEP would eventually be outsourced. The authors 
speculate how far this could develop, where the MP&L manager seeks to preserve his 
personnel and outsource extra volume requirements to a third party logistics provider 
when overall plant volumes increase. Further, it is not surprising that more general 
supplier R&D could not be brought into the supplier park as BEP engine development 
work occurs elsewhere. ‘In terms of R&D, the blue oval engines that we produce at 
Bridgend are linked into our R&D centres in Essex. Jaguar engines are linked with 
Whitney and Gaydon, and the new ‘SI6’ will be linked in with Skővde which is based in 
Sweden’ (Senior Manager). The prospect of attracting design engineering onsite could be 
an attractive proposition bringing in state-aided high tech jobs into a grant area, rather 
than current remote locations. 
 
Analysis  
A combination of operational, processual and contextual factors conspire against the 
plans at Bridgend. A key issue for Ford is presenting a strong business case to suppliers 
for locating on a supplier park. Achieving greater flexibility at BEP is essential and this 
means being able to attract suppliers willing to late configure components on the park 
rather than simply adopting a warehousing strategy. At vehicle assembly plants, the 
business case for doing this is stronger, particularly for the suppliers of interior modules 
which are frequently bulky and require expensive protective packaging in transport. 
Outsourced pre-assembled modular components are not currently a significant feature of 
engine building at Bridgend.  But it is the supply of this type of component that is most 
suitable for a supplier park location and result in the most operational benefits to the firm.  
Suppliers of interior modules win contracts relating to a particular model. Model life 
spans are becoming shorter with frequent redesigns and upgrades, subsequently the 
contract to supply may be renegotiated more frequently. Having made an investment and 
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established relationships with logistics companies and the OEM, a presence on a supplier 
park may put companies in a strong position to win the next contract. However, the life 
span of an engine type is longer and not vehicle specific. Consequently, without the need 
to be in a strong position to bid for frequent next model contracts, engine component 
manufacturers may be less willing to invest in satellite facilities on a supplier park. This 
may also account for the lack of suppliers volunteering to locate at Bridgend. 
In vehicle assembly suitability of suppliers for supplier park location may be determined 
by the size and transportation cost of the module supplied. To reduce transport and 
handling costs and ensure delivery performance, the ability of a supplier to locate on a 
supplier park may be an important part of the OEMs decision to award a contract.  The 
‘hidden’ cost of delivery performance should be included in all arguments to locate to the 
park in order to build the case. 
The European Commission (EC) is investigating the cost benefit analysis presented in 
support of the application by the UK authorities. This contested that the engines for PAG 
would be built in America if Bridgend did not receive grant aid. Comparing the cost of 
the two options suggested that Bridgend would have a cost disadvantage of 10% and 
therefore justified financial aid to keep production in Europe. However, the EC has 
questioned the comparison which formed the basis of the aid submission, on the basis 
that all the engines are destined for UK built vehicles and that the two options were not 
directly comparable. Under the American scheme the engines would be built in America, 
but the V8 engines would be shared between Bridgend and an additional supplier. If the 
hidden costs of sourcing parts and engines from the US are included, then the argument 
may be stronger for Bridgend support. 
In the unlikely event of development aid not being awarded to Bridgend, the cost of 
building an industry park would probably outweigh the operational benefits using current 
cost estimates. This is especially true if suppliers are not presented with a strong business 
case that clearly states any advantages available to them as well as Ford. The case for 
building a supplier park next to an engine plant is difficult to justify without an increase 
in the use of completed sub-assemblies. The proposed industrial park would mean 
suppliers late configure, reducing transportation and inventory costs, and allowing them 
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to add value later in the supply chain. It would also provide Ford with increased 
flexibility in supply to the plant and provides a higher level of semi-skilled jobs, to the 
benefit of the local workforce. 
Ultimately, events external to Bridgend have strongly contributed to the protracted time 
span for constructing local infrastructure and progressing core decisions over park design 
and strategy. BEP managers and the WDA visited the Ford Valencia supplier park in 
1999, yet construction in Wales only began in 2003, with the first (and only) supplier 
arriving onsite in 2005. It is proposed here that the principle causes of this delay were the 
differences in stakeholder motivation and the general inability to reconcile multiple 
perspectives. BEP is increasingly concerned over escalating engine volume and variety, 
and lack of space. WDA’s motivation is derived solely from the desire to safeguard the 
economic future of the region. Ford of Europe continues to focus on the drive to 
restructure, cut costs and return to profitability. Against the backdrop of more dramatic 
events unfolding elsewhere in the company (i.e. plant closure), the pressure on Ford 
senior management to approve expenditure for Bridgend to re-configure its lines of 
supply must have appeared of relatively low importance.  
 
Conclusion 
As firms continue to use best practice as a core ingredient of their strategies it is 
important that researchers respond with robust theoretical concepts explaining adoption 
and implementation processes. However, a great deal of the practice debate remains 
functionally defined and fragmented, and in this respect the paper has sought to integrate 
disparate perspectives across multiple levels of analysis in order to build a richer and 
more believable picture of a stalled supplier park initiative. There are clear limitations to 
this research. In attempting to combine a broad range of theoretical and practical 
elements, there are detailed associated discussions that could have been more fully 
explored. Similarly, there are notes on more than 30 hours of interviews and in 
condensing them into a series of observations and quotes, the researchers own 
interpretation of events is a significant ‘reality’ filter. More specifically, by selecting a 
single case (especially one whose performance appears to diverge from the typical 
 23
supplier park phenomenon) raises inevitable concerns over comparability and 
generalizability of the findings. However, several key conclusions can still be drawn. 
First, the notion of practice bundles has proved to be essential in opening up the 
contingent nature of the building blocks which make up a multi-faceted initiative 
(Macduffie, 1995; Shah and Ward, 2003). So, while supplier parks can in one sense be 
considered ‘best practice’ in a supporting role to Ford vehicle assembly plants, they have 
also experienced supplier relations issues over component pricing at sites across Europe. 
The proposed park at Bridgend represents a ‘double leap of faith’ in terms of it 
representing a hitherto untested hybrid, an industrial park, based on an adaptation of an 
original concept whose benefits are consistently contested. At the same time, there is the 
need to extend the concept to incorporate some of the fundamental network 
characteristics associated with a collaborative bundle such as the supplier park. Given 
that the co-ordination of wholly owned and discrete resources such as equipment and 
inventory is very different from the management of more diffuse resources such as trust 
and market power, this research suggests that an extended classification of ‘practice’ 
based on the extent to which (a) practitioners are able to articulate their relative value (i.e. 
additive capability less potential rigidities) and (b) realise their direct ‘biddability’, could 
add substantially to theoretical and practical development. As an illustration, the case 
highlights the divergence between avowed strategic plans to build a supplier park and the 
specific performance measures and measurement systems that have a crucial impact on 
operational decision-making. Ford’s purchasing departments persistent use of piece cost 
(over other more strategic methods such as total costing) impacted on the supplier park 
initiative because it informed managerial perspectives on what was achievable at crucial 
stages during the project. A supplier park can provide much needed volume and variety 
flexibility, but this was lost to the business because the company was unable to articulate 
the benefits associated with total costing and what it means for global component 
sourcing. 
Second, the process of implementation was characterised by complexity and political 
ambiguity. Confusion developed over the primary motivation for adopting the supplier 
park at Bridgend: the research highlighted both BEP’s urgent need to address the 
increasing space constraints caused by the introduction of PAG engines and the strong 
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desire by the WDA to gain EC funding for the region. This suggests the supplier park 
strategy, while supported locally at Bridgend, lacked a champion to support it at the top 
of the organization. The lack of strategic representation of MP&L and interaction with 
Purchasing suggests that the WDA and BEP failed to secure the necessary support of 
senior management and, correspondingly, to convince suppliers of the value of 
relocation. Moreover, it was difficult to determine the precise effect traumatic events 
such as UK plant closures and pan-European business re-organization had on the early 
phases of the supplier park planning and adoption process. Taken as a whole, it is clearly 
limiting to conceive of change here as a linear transition from one state to another. In the 
case of BEP it is more a continuous ebb and flow of micro/macro events, shaped by 
multiple institutional and managerial perspectives. This reflects the trend towards a 
broadening of Operations Management practice and the increasing interest in areas such 
as supply strategy (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984; Fine and Hax, 1985; Dyer, 1996).       
Finally, there is clear evidence that the adoption of supplier park practice at Ford and 
other automaker sites has influenced the thinking of operations managers at BEP. Yet the 
direct transfer of these practices based on supporting vehicle final assembly leads to a 
high level of ambiguity over what is the right approach for an engine plant. This type of 
ambiguity is often followed by isomorphic or bandwagon responses, where firms are 
faced with high levels of decision-making uncertainty (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). 
While the rational arguments of increased pressure on space and flexibility are clearly 
present in the BEP case, other conditions that have secured supplier park practice at 
vehicle assembly sites are not, such as influence over supplier location. This reinforces 
the argument for theory concerning operations and supply practice adoption to consider 
the wider impact of contextual variables when planning new initiatives, particularly the 
influence of institutional and strategic choice perspectives. 
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Appendix A, Figure A1: Chronology - Ford Motor Company and BEP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1977                     Ford announces plans to build an engine plant at Bridgend 
1979                     First employee starts at Bridgend in September 
 
1980                     Bridgend Engine Plant (BEP) opens in May. First 1000 engines – CVH Escort. 
1981   BEP engine production reaches 250,000 
 
1983  BEP reaches 1million engines (since opening) 
 
1987   Ford buys AstonMartin 
1988  3 million engines (since opening). Zetec engine launch announced. 
1989   Ford buys Jaguar 
 
1990   BEP reaches 5 million engines (since opening) 
1991   First Zetec engine at BEP 
 
1994  ‘FORD 2000’ initiative - reorganisation of the global business  
1995    BEP reaches 7 million engines (since opening). Sigma engine launch 
1996   Jaguar AJV8 engine Job 1  
 
1999  Ford announces plans for creation of the Premier Automotive Group  
Ford buys Volvo Car Corporation 
BEP managers visit Ford Valencia supplier park with Welsh Development Agency  
 
2000   Decision by Ford to build park at BEP 
  Major restructuring of operations announced at Ford of Europe 
2001  BEP wins $425 million of new PAG engine business 
Ford buys Land Rover 
2002  Announcement of transfer of Volvo engine production to BEP 
  Closure of the Dagenham vehicle assembly plant 
2003  Park road links and infrastructure in place at Bridgend for industry park 
Job 1 from new engine line installed for 4.4ltr and V8 New Land Rover Discovery 
2004   SI6 engine launch for Volvo 
2005  Logistics cross-docking facilities in place at park 
  First and only supplier ‘BBB’ located and begins operating from park 
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Figure 1: Estimated BEP production volume 1979 – 2009 
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Strategic choice Supplier Park Practice Sources 
Supply stability  • Avoiding disturbance  
• Security & eliminating shrinkage 
• Bring suppliers physically closer 
• Creating dedicated non-OEM space 
• Dedicated infrastructure 
Svensson (2000)  
Chew (2003)  
Dyer and Singh (1998) 
Cullen (2002) 
Miemczyk and Howard (2004) 
Slack et al (2004) 
Supply 
coordination 
• BOM simplification 
• Supply consolidation/rationalisation 
• Improved inventory management 
practices (e.g. VMI) 
• JIT and JIS supply 
Reichhart and Holweg (2005) 
Cousins (1999) 
Dyer and Singh (1998) 
 
Schonberger (1982) 
Value chain re-
configuration 
• Warehousing, sequencing e.g. SILS 
• Assembly & late-configuration 
• Full assembly 
• Manufacture 
• Modularisation 
Reichhart and Holweg (2005) 
Dyer and  Singh (1998) 
Larsson (2002)  
     “ 
Sako (2003) 
Enhanced 
interaction 
• More regular meetings & focus groups 
• Sharing confidential information 
(Inventory policies) 
• Cooperation with competitors 
• Knowledge generation 
Larsson (2002), Saxenian 
(1994) 
Reichhart and Holweg (2005) 
Reichhart and Holweg (2005) 
Saxenian (1994) 
Table 1: Practices adopted at European supplier parks 
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Engine Production years 
(Job 1 – shutdown) 
Displacement 
(Litres) 
Differentiating factors  
(eg Fuelling arrangements) 
 Variety 
‘E1’ 1979 - 1997 
 
 
 
1995 - 1997 
1.3 
1.4 
1.6 
1.8 
1.4 E 
• Derivative 
introduced in 1995 
 
 
 
 
5 
‘E2’  
Petrol 
4 cylinder 
 
1991 - 2004 1.4 
1.6 
1.8 
2.0 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
‘E3’  
Petrol V8 
1996 -  3.5 
4.2 
• Supercharged & 
naturally aspirated 
• 3 models 
 
 
6 
‘E4’ 
Petrol  
4 cylinder 
1998 -  1.25 
1.4 
1.6 
• Variable cam timing 
(VCT) & non-VCT 
• 2 vehicle 
applications 
• Manual & automatic 
 
 
 
9 
‘E5’ 
Petrol V8 
2004 - 4.2 
4.4 
• 2 fuelling 
arrangements 
• 2 models 
 
 
4 
‘E6’  
Petrol I6 
     c. 2006 - 3.2 
3.0 
• 3.0 Litre 
supercharged 
• 3 models 
• Models within 
brands 
 
 
 
24 
‘E7’   
Petrol V8 
(upgrade) 
     c. 2008 - 3.5 
4.2 
4.3 
4.4 
• 4.2 Litre 
supercharged 
 
 
 
7 
Table 2: BEP product variety 1979 – 2009 
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 No. Date Interviewee/s Scope 
1 20 October   2001 Development Manager 
Project Manager 
WDA plans for the development of the 
Welsh automotive sector 
2 
 
14 February  2002 MP&L Manager Initial site visit and familiarisation with BEP 
3 6 March Global Order Fulfilment 
Director 
Ford global supply strategy Detroit, US  
4 12 April Program Manager Site visit to Delphi, PAG supplier park, 
Sweden. 
5 16 April Production Manager 
Client Executive 
Site visit to Delphi, Ellesmere Port 
6 18 July          2003 MP&L Manager 
Development Manager  
Site visit to proposed BEP park 
 
7 21 July Project Manager Q&A session: supply chain complexity at 
BEP 
8 28 November MP&L Manager 
Project Manager 
Engine-block supply using CMMS v 
eSMART at BEP 
9 
 
14 January   2004 Plant Manager Analysis of BEP production plant 
10 25 February MP&L Manager 
Rail Manager 
Analysis of BEP railway link and eSMART 
IT system 
11 
 
2 June Plant Manager BEP supply chain mapping session 
12 21 June MP&L Manager Initial research findings to BEP 
  
13 30 July MP&L Manager 
Plant Manager 
Presentation and feedback with BEP 
managers 
14 22 November Supply Manager Site visit to SiemensVDO to discuss supplier 
scheduling 
15 19 January   2005 Logistics Manager 
Logistics Engineer 
Site visit to Ford supplier park in Cologne, 
Germany   
16 
 
25 February   MP&L Manager Meeting to review current progress with park 
17 
 
22 March Development Manager Discussion over WDA regional aid for BEP 
18 11-12 May MP&L Vice-President 
MP&L Manager  
Meeting with PAG member Volvo to discuss 
SP strategy 
19 9 -10 November MP&L Manager Meeting with Volvo to discuss global 
sourcing strategy 
20 19 December MP&L Manager Meeting to review situation with BEP and 
Ford Europe strategy 
   
             Table 3: Supply practice research 
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Strategic Intent Supplier Park Practice Present at Bridgend 
Supply stability  • Avoiding disturbance  
• Security & minimising shrinkage 
• Bring supplier physically closer 
• Creating dedicated non-OEM space 
• Dedicated infrastructure 
- 
- 
* One supplier BBB 
* Single warehouse 
- 
Supply 
coordination 
• BOM simplification 
• Supply consolidation/rationalisation 
• Improved inventory management 
practices (e.g. VMI) 
• JIT and JIS supply 
- 
* Rationalised 32 to 1 
* Complexity to supplier 
 
* JIT to BEP 
Value chain re-
configuration 
• Warehousing  
• Sequencing e.g. SILS  
• Assembly & late-configuration  
• Full assembly 
• Manufacture 
• Modularisation 
* Dedicated warehouse 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Enhanced 
interaction 
• More regular meetings/focus groups 
• Sharing confidential information 
(Inventory policies) 
• Cooperation with competitors 
• Knowledge generation 
- 
- 
 
* Discuss design changes 
- 
Table 4: Practices adopted at BEP 
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